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SINO-AFRICAN PHILOSOPHY:
A RE-“CONSTRUCTIVE ENGAGEMENT”
PAUL A. DOTTIN

ABSTRACT:

“Constructive-Engagement” is a meta-philosophical and metamethodological “strategy” suggested by Chinese and comparative philosophy scholar Bo
Mou for analyzing and enriching philosophical exchange. In this paper, I will use this
strategy towards an end, on a scale, and with a topic not attempted before. I will use it as a
“template” for redesigning a poorly developing area of cross-cultural comparison I call
Sino-African reflective studies (SARS). My goal in this work-in-progress is to design a plan
for reconstituting SARS as Sino-African philosophy (SAP), an inclusive yet coherent field of
research and innovation unified through organizing principles. I will design the overhaul of
SARS in three stages. First, by surveying SARS for its basic features including its structural
flaws. Second, by remapping SARS in line with “renovation” principles drawn from its
literature. Third, by blueprinting SARS in line with “construction” principles theorized from
the constructive-engagement strategy (CES).
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1. FROM SINO-AFRICAN REFLECTIVE STUDIES
TO SINO-AFRICAN PHILOSOPHY
The relations between the African continent and China have shown unprecedented
economic, political and social growth over the past three decades. Yet as the study of
these interactions has intensified, the research work comparing African and Chinese
philosophical, cultural and religious ideas has remained modest. I will argue that
disorganization is a fundamental reason to date for the underwhelming performance
of Sino-African reflective studies 1 (SARS), a collective term coined for works
________________________
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1

The word ‘reflective’ is used here instead of my original choice, ‘conceptual’, in order that its use in
key terms in this paper not be confused with Heideggerian interpretations. When the words ‘concept’
or ‘conceptual’ are used in this paper, they should be understood in their conventional, non-technical
senses.
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that populate this nominal field. If substantially reformulated, I contend that SARS
would enrich Chinese-African dialogue in cross-cultural philosophy. Towards this
end, I will utilize the constructive-engagement strategy 2 (CES) of Chinese and
comparative philosophy scholar Bo Mou as part of a larger framework to survey,
remap and blueprint SARS’ redesign. The envisioned intellectual yield of this
overhaul will be a draft for developing this proto-field into an integrated intertradition inquiry deserving of the name Sino-African philosophy (SAP) as an
academic identity.3
The words “inquiry” and “identity” above are weighted terms in this project. They
are the interconnected theoretic ‘object-ives’4 that I foresee being required to bring
SAP into fruition. (Henceforth, I differentiate them as ‘SAP-Inquiry’ and ‘SAPIdentity’ or simply ‘Inquiry’ and ‘Identity’.) However, a complete design overhaul of
SARS is beyond the scope of this paper. Instead, I will show how one of the objectives—Identity—can be built with a scaffolding of organizing principles. Together
these organizing principles would constitute an infrastructure for SARS from which
to develop the emerging field in the direction of SAP.
These organizing principles will be derived from two sources: first, via patterns
observed arising within SARS, and second, via categorical resources derived from
CES. I refer to the SARS-derived organizing principles as ranges and genres. I will
use them to “renovate” SARS into more philosophically aligned arrangements. I refer
to the CES-derived organizing principles by the same terms Mou created for them in
2

In light of prominent featuring of Africa and Africans in this study, it is important to avoid what
would be an unfortunate confusion between ‘constructive-engagement’ the strategy and ‘constructive
engagement’ the policy. The latter was a controversial initiative by the U.S. government during Ronald
Reagan’s presidency to end Apartheid in South Africa through incentives rather than sanctions. The
international policy and the inter-tradition strategy are entirely unrelated.
3
It is too far afield of this paper’s immediate goals to enter into the debate over what ‘philosophy’ is or
is not and of whether African or Chinese traditions “qualify” as such. I acknowledge that those
questions may eventually affect some of the ways SARS/SAP is renovated-constructed. Mou’s
definition and signaled usage for the term ‘philosophy’ is minimally what I intend for SAP. As Mou
states:

4

…the label ‘philosophy’ (or its counterparts in the phonetic languages) can be, and actually is, used
referentially (if not fully descriptively at the initial stage of using the term) to designate such a generic type
of reflective inquiry: (1) philosophical inquiry can ask any fundamental questions, and can have various
fundamental concerns, about the world and human beings; (2) philosophical inquiry is critical in nature in the
sense that it does not blindly claim or accept anything and nothing is absolutely excluded from a
philosophical inquirer’s gaze; (3) philosophical inquiry establishes its conclusion intrinsically and primarily
through argumentation, justification, and explanation rather than being based on faith. The foregoing three
crucial features of philosophical inquiry have thus become the due contents of the very notion of
philosophical inquiry as held in the (worldwide) philosophical community (2010, 3, fn. 2, author’s
emphases).

According to Mou, a philosophical “…object is not necessarily some ontological object in some
standard sense like a chair or a tree but an object in the following minimal metaphysical sense: what
counts as such an object can be anything that could emerge as, or be objectified into, a thing under
reflective examination. [For example,] [t]he object in question might be…virtue, piety, and the relation
between the individual and the collective in ethical study, or anything that deserves reflective
examination” (Mou 2001, 345). ‘Inquiry’ and ‘Identity’ are ‘objects’ in this latter non-physical sense.
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his strategy. These principles are called movement, orientation and phase—though
my usages are somewhat different. I will employ them to “construct” a more
explicitly philosophical scaffolding for SARS. Each set of organizing principles
represents a stage in my overall “renovative-constructive-engagement” (or “renconstruction”) plan to transform the SARS proto-field into Sino-African philosophy.
However, before theorizing any kind of renovation or construction, the intellectual
materials in need of reworking should be identified. What follows is a preliminary
survey of some of the key features of SARS.
2. SURVEYING SINO-AFRICAN REFLECTIVE STUDIES
2.1

TEXTUAL CHARACTERISTICS

The basic building material of SARS is the Sino-African reflective text 5 (SART).
SARTs are works comparing, spurring or inventing conceptual interchanges between
sub-Saharan African and Sinitic (i.e., “Chinese” predominately but occasionally other
Asian) thought-systems. These texts usually draw upon the respective cultural,
religious and/or philosophical traditions of peoples indigenous to those regions.
It should be clarified further what is meant by ‘text’ in this context. Texts differ in
their sources. SARTs surveyed in this study will be English-language published and
unpublished academic works such as scholarly books, professional journal articles,
doctoral dissertations and conference papers. Texts differ in size. Some texts are
extended reflections on African and Chinese ideas while others are brief tangents
found in otherwise focused works. Some take up large sections of academic books
hundreds of pages long (e.g., Kruger 1995; Robinson-Morris, Jr. 2018) while others
are less than a hundred words (e.g., Kamalu 1990, preface). Yet the size of a text or
even its stated focus does not determine automatically a text’s potential importance to
SARS/SAP. For example, in an essay focusing on the state of African philosophy in
Africa, the few lines written tangentially about “Oriental philosophy” by the esteemed
Ghanaian African philosopher, Kwasi Wiredu, are interesting (1984, 44). On the
other hand, Futures Studies researchers Tim Kumpe and Kuo-Hua Chen’s nineteenpage rumination (2014) on the fostering of greater “wisdom” in Africa-China
relations does not consider any African or Chinese philosophical ideas or approaches.
A single published or unpublished work may contain several texts that can be
distinguished through different assessments of their significance to the renovation/
construction of SARS/SAP. Texts will be categorized and re-categorized as different
types of SART depending on those assessments, as we shall see. I do not count,
however, the same Sino-African reflective text more than once in the calculation of
the total number of texts surveyed. Keeping this all in mind leads to a rough sum of
about sixty SARTs.
One may question why I cast such a broad definitional net for SARTs. Why not
“stick” just with its straightforward works of philosophy? Reasons for including texts
5

See footnote 1.

Comparative Philosophy 10.1 (2019)

DOTTIN

41

that might not be conventionally accepted as “philosophy texts” are underscored
throughout this paper but I shall summarize my defense here: it would be imprudent
to prohibit a priori any text exhibiting reflection on Chinese and African ideas but
otherwise displaying none or few of the disciplinary credentials of being a work of
professional philosophy, such as a text having been authored by an academicallytrained philosopher or having been published within one of the discipline’s scholarly
journals.
The immediate reason to resist using such conventional disciplinary parameters
for a text’s inclusion within SARS is that it makes little sense to determine
beforehand what intellectual materials will be needed to (re)create this proto-field.
However, the desiderata for this renovation-construction project may be anticipated
through analysis and theorization. This is my defense for making—initially—the
definition of ‘text’ quite broad and the acceptance of source material quite liberal; it is
to enable the capture of any idea from any source within SARS “literature” that may
have the potential to aid in SAP’s construction. Yet the irony is not lost on me that in
my quest to make SARS more “philosophical” by making it more recognizable,
acceptable and useful to comparative philosophers will require drawing, in good
measure, on disciplines other than philosophy.
Having discussed the parameters of my notion of SART, I will resume outlining
the remaining disciplinary, topical, and cultural-tradition characteristics of the SARS
literature.
2.2

DISCIPLINARY AND TOPICAL CHARACTERISTICS

In addition to the textual issue, another underlying reason why labeling SARS more
simply as a ‘philosophy’ is complicated is because the proto-field is actually made up
of several different disciplines. Noted in the survey were the disciplines of education,
religious studies, international relations, business management, intercultural
communication, media studies, art history/performance studies, and, of course,
philosophy. Observed through Western categories of philosophy, Sino-African
reflective scholars can be said to conduct their research mainly within the areas of
ethics, ontology and metaphysics. The more commonly investigated ideas are
“harmony”, “personhood” and “community”. The more commonly investigated
aspects of those notions are “personal agency”, “filial piety”, “ancestor reverence”
and “guanxi” (關係).
2.3

TRADITIONS: AFRICAN

SARS scholars investigate several African and Chinese traditions for similarities and
differences. Pertaining to Africa, those traditions are “African thought” and the Akan,
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Ibgo, Nguni,6 San and Yoruba traditions. Pertaining to China, they are “East Asian
thought” and the Confucian, Daoist and Buddhist traditions.
African thought in SARS is a broad term encompassing secular and sacred ideas
said to be long-held and still significant to many black Africans. ‘African thought’ is
produced either through a synthesis of many purportedly African cultural traits by the
SARS scholar (e.g., Igbafen 2014) or by adopting existing anthropological/ folklorist/
linguistic researches positing similar traditional worldviews among different, often
geographically distant, African peoples. John Mbiti’s African Religion and
Philosophy (1969), E.A. Ruch and K.C. Anyawnu’s African Philosophy (1981) and
Chukwunyere Kamalu’s Foundations of African Thought (1990) are prime examples
of such “ethnophilosophies” used in SARS. After surveying the literature, I detected
at least seven generic designations for African traditional thought used in SARS.
Most African reflections were referred to as “sub-Saharan thought”, “African
thought”, “African traditions”, “African philosophy” or less frequently as “African
religion”, “African culture”, “African values” or “African ethics”.
Several African religious/philosophical traditions are specified in SARS. The
better recognized by name arguably are the Akan, Igbo, Nguni, San and Yoruba
traditions. The Akan tradition was originated by traditional sages 7 in Ghana.
Philosopher Kwame Gyeke identifies them generally as onyansafo.8 Akan reflective
thought was enriched substantially by modern academic philosophers such as Gyeke,
William Abraham, Kwasi Wiredu and K. Anthony Appiah. The Igbo tradition was
created by traditional sages in Nigeria. Igbo philosophy has been advanced by
religious studies/philosophy scholars such as Emmanuel Edeh, Pantaleon Iroegbu and
Kanu Ikechukwu Anthony. The San tradition was originated by the traditional sages
of a non-Bantu people living in Southern Africa (mainly Botswana, Namibia and
South Africa). The respective ethnographic investigations by Lorna Marshall, David
J. Lewis-Williams and D. G. Pearce, and Mathias Georg Guenther on San cosmology
and religion have substantially advanced knowledge on those topics. The Yoruba
tradition was formulated originally by Nigerian and Beninese traditional sages.
Philosopher Barry Hallen described the Yoruba sage as an individual clearly
surpassing “the sort of analysis one would expect from the ordinary ‘man of the
6

Nguni are southern African peoples who speak Bantu languages. This group includes Ndebele,
Swazi, Xhosa and Zulu peoples living predominantly in South Africa and Zimbabwe.
7
By ‘sage’, I mean primarily ‘philosophic sage’, as the term was defined in African philosophy by the
late Kenyan philosopher Henry Odera Oruka. According to Oruda, a philosophic sage is a man or
woman

8

of traditional African culture, capable of the critical, second-order type of thinking about the various
problems of human life and nature; persons, that is, who subject beliefs that are traditionally taken for granted
to independent rational reexamination and who are inclined to accept or reject such beliefs on the authority of
reason rather than on the basis of a communal or religious consensus (Masolo 2016, with quotation from
Oruda 1990, 5-6).

See Gyeke 1995, 62-3 for description of the intellectual traits and social practice an Akan onyansofo
pursues that make this sage a “philosophic” one. I will assume philosophic sages in the San, Yoruba,
Igbo and Nguni traditions function similarly to the Akan “version” albeit with some cultural
differences.
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street’…because of his exceptional training and knowledge as an onisegun…” (2006,
20, my emphasis). Among the tradition’s better known philosophers are Segun
Gbadegesin, the late J. Olubi Sodipo and Hallen.
A number of Sino-African comparisons involving these traditions exist. There is
J.S. Kruger’s (1995) comparisons between concepts created by San thinkers and ideas
from Buddhism and Daoism/yin-yang (陰陽) thought. Kruger also made a brief
speculation involving Bantu Sotho–Tswana religious beliefs and Buddhism (1995,
255). John I. Unah has revealed certain similarities between Yoruba, Daoist and
Confucian thought. There are likenesses between omoluabi, the “ideal man” concept
in Yoruba thought, and the Confucian notion of sage, he contends (2014, 117). Unah
has also ventured that the “concept of Tao” (Dao 道) in Chinese philosophy and the
notion of “vital force” in African philosophy perform roughly “similar roles” (2014,
118). Kweku Ampiah (2014) relates Confucian notions of filial piety and ancestor
worship to those from Ghana’s Akan culture. Molefi Kete Asante and Rosemary Chai
(2013) compare the Akan concept for ‘destiny’, known as nkrabea, to the
approximation in Chinese Buddhism known as yuanfen (緣分). Onukwube Anedo
(2012) juxtaposes “harmony frameworks” centered around the Chinese (Confucian)
notion of he (和) and Igbo concept of udo. However, no other African tradition
identified by a culture-specific tradition name has been compared more with Chinese
thought than the Nguni philosophy of Ubuntu.
Ubuntu philosophy originated from now anonymous Nguni sages. Its discussion
in writing extends back to the mid-nineteenth century (Gade 2011). Its seminal
discussion as a philosophy, Hunhuism or Ubuntuism, was written in 1980 by
Zimbabweans Stanlake Samkange and Tommie Marie Samkange. Ubuntu philosophy
developed substantially during the 1990s within the context of South Africa’s
transition from a racist Apartheid state to a multi-cultural democracy (Gade 2011). A
list of some of the philosophy’s key theoreticians from that time and since would
include South African theologians Archbishop Desmond Tutu and Augustine Shutte
and philosophers Mogobe Ramose, Leonhard Praeg and the American Thaddeus
Metz.
2.4 TRADITIONS: SINITIC
East Asian thought is my term to encompass “Eastern philosophy” and “Oriental
philosophy”, the main generalizations in SARS for the region’s traditions. (Such
overly broad terms are not used as often with Sinitic traditions as they are with
African traditions.) Several Sinitic religious/philosophical traditions are specified in
SARS. The better recognized by name are Confucianism, Daoism and Buddhism.
Comparisons between Confucianism and African traditions draw from the pre-Qin
dynasty “classical” thinkers of the Chinese philosophy. Confucius, and to a lesser
extent, Mencius, are referred to via the Analects (Lun-Yu 論語) and the Mencius
(Meng-Zi 孟子). Xun Zi, the third great Confucian thinker of this period, is rarely
mentioned (see Du Toit 2015 for an exception). As for Daoism, SARS research

Comparative Philosophy 10.1 (2019)

DOTTIN

44

assimilates notions from pre-Qin dynasty “classical Taoism” (Kruger 1995, 300).
The Dao-De-Jing ( 道 德 經 ) is referenced or alluded to in most comparisons.
Emphasis is on the metaphysics presented in this text, namely, the “Taoist yin-yang”
(Kruger 1995, 286; Kamalu 1990, preface). Unah (1996) does not compare Daoist
and African concepts directly but may be the first to place Daoism (and
Confucianism) and African philosophy similarly within a shared problematic,
namely, the “trouble” Western philosophy has had with recognizing either African or
Chinese reflective systems as “philosophy”. Unah (2011) does initiate an AfricanDaoism comparison, focusing on the “authenticity, choice and purpose” of the self.
Unah followed up a few years later with a meta-ethical comparison of those traditions
(2014). A more advanced exploration of subjectivity (and epistemology) is pursued
by Wu, et al. (2018). Unah (2011) is perhaps the first scholar whose comparisons
went beyond the Dao-De-Jing to employ also Daoist ideas articulated by Yang Zhu
(楊朱) and Zhuang Zi (莊子), respectively.
As for Buddhism, use of China’s Hua-Yan school (Hua-Yan-Zong 華嚴宗), a
Tang dynasty (唐朝) development of Indian Mahayana thought, is mentioned or
alluded to by Michel Clasquin (1999) and Kruger (1995, 1999). There have been brief
correspondences hypothesized about certain Tibetan Buddhist and South African
legends and myths by Wratten (1995) and Loue (1999). There are “pan-Buddhist”
conceptual matters evident in Bhikkhu Kaboggoza Buddharakkhita’s (2006) account
of tensions between his Theravada doctrine, ritual and iconography and that of
Kenyan and Ugandan traditional thought (and evangelical Christianity). (I include
these latter cases of non-Chinese Buddhism because they each might provide
perspectives within the “range” of my renovation project, as I will explain below.)
More surveying of Sino-African reflective studies is required before further
delineations of SARS can be made. However, sufficient detail has been presented that
certain impediments to SAP’s emergence can be highlighted.
3. PROBLEMS WITH SINO-AFRICAN REFLECTIVE STUDIES
Thousands of scholarly books, reports and articles have been written on Sino-African
relations. Yet virtually absent, even from some of the more subject-inclusive SinoAfrican literature surveys written over the last decade (e.g., Li 2005 and 2016;
Simbao 2012; Monson and Rupp 2013; Monson 2016), are works reflecting on
Chinese and African philosophical concepts. It could be surmised from this virtual
absence that SARS has made little topical or theoretical impact on Sino-African
relations studies. I suspect that the impression made to date by SARS upon
comparative philosophy has also been faint. One could blame SARS’ recent
emergence for it having had so little impact as yet on those research fields. This is to
an extent, true, but one could do better analytically than simply chalking up the field’s
feebleness to its immaturity. It can be shown there are external and internal factors
sapping SARS’ potential. I will bracket consideration of external factors for they are
largely out of philosophers’ hands to change. Philosophers have a better chance of
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mitigating the internal reasons for SARS’ relative lethargy. What are those internal
reasons?
3.1 SARS: “MULTIPLE DISCIPLINARY”, BUT NOT “INTER-DISCIPLINARY”
SARS researches are scattered across several disciplines. Based on ongoing research,
about 22 per cent of the nearly sixty SARTs identified so far are written by religious
studies scholars. Close to another 22 per cent are authored by international relations
specialists. About 24 per cent—nearly a full quarter—come from other nonphilosophy disciplines ranging from Business Management to Futures Studies.
Philosophy is the largest single contributor at close to 30 per cent but at least seven
other disciplines constitute the proto-field with two together constituting roughly 44
per cent of it. Being a vessel molded by multiple disciplines is a defining trait of
SARS.
While there are strengths to be harnessed to SAP from SARS’ diversity,
possessing multiple disciplines that share ‘Sino-Africa’ as an area of concern but are
barely aligned otherwise is detrimental to the maturation of SARS in the following
related ways:
(1) Little referencing of reflective scholarship generated within one discipline
occurs in another discipline. Therefore, not much intellectual correspondence has
occurred between SARS’ disciplines. There are very few joint publications between
SARS African and Chinese thought scholars. Articles such as Bell and Metz (2011),
Asante and Chai (2013) and Wu, et al. (2018) are rare exceptions. Yet the
development of existing lines of research and the creation of new ones should be
informed significantly by what is happening intellectually throughout SARS, not just
by what is occurring within a scholar’s favored section of it.9 Otherwise, little in the
manner of a terminological lingua franca will emerge among its authors.
(2) No one discipline has been established as SARS’ intellectual “hub.” More
tellingly for SAP, philosophy scholarship in SARS has yet to clearly harness the
proto-field’s different disciplinary strengths to a philosophical agenda. What exists
instead is a hodge-podge of conceptualizations and approaches. Hence, while SARS
can be aptly seen as a formation of various disciplines, it cannot be rightly called an
inter-disciplinary one.
3.2 SARS: “TRADITIONS-PAIRED”, BUT NOT “TRADITIONS-BRIDGING”
Nor, ironically, can SARS be called a fully inter-tradition endeavor. Sino-African
reflective scholars who work on one type of Sino-African tradition-pairing do not
often mention studies carried out on a different type of Sino-African tradition-pairing
9

One of the achievements of the constructive-engagement movement, according to Mou, is that it “has
become a collective enterprise involving systematic efforts instead of individual scholars’ personal
projects” (Mou 2009c, 573). SARS should become a systematic enterprise as well—hence, the efforts
at Renovation-Construction.
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that may be germane. For example, it is quite common to find that scholars working
on, say, Confucianism and Ubuntu, have not related their research to comparative
investigations on, say, Daoism and Ubuntu, for possible relevance. Unah (2014) is a
rare counter example, albeit one that is at the very start of such explorations. In short,
SARS is puzzlingly both traditions-bridging yet traditions-bound.
SARS exists as a paradox. Multiple disciplines and many traditions constitute it,
yet these same disciplines and traditions frequently operate in practical isolation from
each other. I argue these internal impediments to SARS’ development radiate from a
fundamental problem: poor organization.
With SARS’ scholarship so disconnected, the synergy needed to spur new
engagements or deepen investigations of its more commonly examined concepts has
not manifested. For example, many SARTs are what philosopher Robert E. Allinson
might classify as being conducted in a “positive comparativist” manner (Allinson
2001, 272). What generally occurs in SARS are “searches for likenesses and
unlikenesses between the two traditions…[but] normally there is no active
expropriation of issues, concerns, or methods found originally in the other tradition
and consequent alteration of methods in…[the first] tradition” (ibid.). This speaks to a
failure to “internalize” the reflections of the other side typically by either the “Sino”
or the “Afri” interlocutor. Perhaps this explains some part of the reason why even
philosophy-SARS have not garnered the level of interest one might expect in African,
Chinese or comparative philosophies at a time when interest in Sino-African studies
appears to be burgeoning.
Undoubtedly this proto-field will continue to grow through an incremental buildup of hit-or-miss publications. The real question is, therefore, whether that
progression will actually advance the field’s quality impressively or whether a
ponderous increase in the number of texts on more or less predictable topics is likely
to galvanize Sino-African reflection. What is at stake for SARS, in CES terms, is
whether the emerging field can in the near future begin to make unique and
significant contributions to “the development of philosophy and of society” (Mou
2016, 265). It is hard to imagine SARS generating that kind of intellectual or
“political” relevance unaided. It is hard to imagine SAP germinating from the
presently scattered, uneven efforts of SARS without the intervention of some form of
intellectual scaffolding.
The next logical step is, therefore, to design such a scaffolding. Constructiveengagement provides a strategy that can be adapted to build such a framework.
4. STRATEGY, TEMPLATE, SCAFFOLD
FOR SINO-AFRICAN REFLECTIVE STUDIES
4.1

STRATEGY

Mou defines his ‘constructive-engagement strategy for comparative philosophy’
(which I abbreviate also as “CES”) thusly:
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The constructive engagement strategy as one general strategic methodology in doing
philosophy comparatively, briefly speaking, is this: to inquire into how, by way of
reflective criticism (including self-criticism) and argumentation, distinct approaches from
different philosophical traditions (whether distinguished culturally or by styles and
orientations) can learn from each other and jointly contribute to the contemporary
development of philosophy (and thus the development of contemporary society) on a
range of philosophical issues or topics, which can be jointly concerned and approached
through appropriate philosophical interpretation and/or from a broader philosophical
vantage point (Mou 2015a, 1-2).

Having come to the definition of CES, I am now equipped to recast the object-ive of
this paper more explicitly in its terms.
4.2

TEMPLATE

Sino-African philosophy is intended to be an inter-disciplinary yet coherent form of
inquiry and innovation in the service of philosophical comparison and dialogue. SAP
is the “broader philosophical vantage point,” the raison d'etre for the ren-construction
of SARS. SAP, however, in this yet-to-be-created meta-level sense, is complicated (it
is “two-dimensional” being both Identity and Inquiry) to fully render, even
schematically, at this time.
This is why I have chosen to focus on just one of its meta-objects, ‘Identity.’ I
have positioned Identity to be a more “relatable” substitute for SAP writ large
because it is arguably an easier first step toward understanding SAP than Inquiry.
SAP-Identity is intended to function as a more proximate, more conceivable yet
rather broad meta-philosophical vantage point. In theory, it performs this function by,
on the one hand, positioning a scholar “close enough” to a single object-ive as to be
able to gauge critically whether the prospect of ren-construction is reasonably feasible
for Identity and hence possibly so as well for SAP. Yet, on the other hand, Identity
still being on the scale of a meta-philosophical object—with a large, prescriptive goal,
at that—may keep a scholar at a “far enough” cognitive distance so that Identity takes
on some of the characteristics of an intellectual ideal, and, like SAP, could inspire
scholars already inclined to develop Sino-African relations, to do so through an interculturally resonant philosophy.
I contend that CES could buttress these intellectual and attitudinal components of
Identity in the following ways: (1) CES engenders a productive “open attitude”
toward doing inter-cultural philosophy. CES, as Mou states, “looks at…how [through]
cross-tradition engagement in philosophy…we can learn from each other and jointly
contribute to the common goal of contemporary development of philosophy and the
development of contemporary society…” (Mou 2015b, 58). (2) CES is rigorous. It
proceeds “through criticism and self-criticism and philosophical argumentation…
instead of taking a passive and less philosophically-interesting ‘mere-tolerance’
attitude” (Mou 2015b, 58). (3) CES is practical. It provides a latticework for
philosophical dialogue. As Mou explains, CES “gives a working metamethodological framework for evaluation and constructive engagement: [wherein] the
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relevant resources can be used for the sake of effective evaluation and thus can be
tested for their explanatory force” (Mou 2015b, 59). (4) CES welcomes diverse
interlocutors. Its potential to facilitate discourse between Chinese philosophy and
other non-Western traditions was indicated by Mou. He wrote particularly of its
capacity to function as a “methodological template” for Chinese-African exchanges
(2009b, 599).
4.3

SCAFFOLD

At the meta-philosophical level of ren-construction, what should be considered is the
coordination of organizing principles more so than the comparison of a tradition’s or
discipline’s concepts. As a template, one could predict that organizing principles
formulated from CES would have this capacity to coordinate.
But what of SARS? Though an emerging field, does it nonetheless possess
(re)organizing principles or the rudiments of ones? This is an important question for
we should avoid overwriting potentially useful renovation principles with what could
be stronger principles from construction since constructive-engagement is a welldeveloped strategy. To bar against the creation of a disjointed ren-construction, I will
first demonstrate the importance of organizing principles distilled from patterns
observed among SARTs. Theorization of CES’s capacity to organize will follow.
5. RENOVATION:
REMAPPING SINO-AFRICAN REFLECTIVE STUDIES
5.1 RENOVATION OF SARS BY “RANGE” PRINCIPLE
One SARS renovation should be the organization of SARTs by range. ‘Ranges’ are
different clusterings of SARTs according to how similar some are to each other in
sophistication, insight and/or rigor. Ranges are also established according to how
similar SARTs are in those qualities to SARTs authored by some of the proto-field’s
philosophers. The latter stipulation does not mean that philosophers have authored all
the best texts in the field. Yet since my project is a philosophical one and because a
good number of the better quality SARTs are by philosophers, it makes sense to use
those texts to orient the initial organization of Sino-African reflective texts. Grouping
texts into ranges is a preliminary means of considering the potential relevance of any
text within SARS to SAP without consideration of the text’s disciplinary origin.
Examining approximately sixty SARTs generated the following range categories:
prompter, primary, proximate, provocative and peripheral.
(1) Prompter range texts encourage Sino-African reflective engagements but do
not actually conduct such investigations. An example of a Prompter text would be
Wiredu’s two sentences advising African philosophers to adopt the following attitude
toward “Far Eastern thought”: “With regard to the varieties of Oriental philosophy the
need at present is to study them in the first place. To restrict ourselves to Western

Comparative Philosophy 10.1 (2019)

DOTTIN

49

philosophy, even if we approach it critically, would in itself betray a colonial
mentality” (1984, 44). About 25 per cent of SARTs are Prompter texts.
(2) Primary range texts are typically the strongest straightforward examples of
inter-tradition comparison. Primary range texts together constitute what could be
described as the topical and methodological “baseline” of SARS. Theirs are the
concepts targeted and approaches pursued most often. A good number were written
by philosophers and religious studies scholars.
Of the philosophers, a co-authored article by two of them, Daniel A. Bell and
Thaddeus Metz (2011), is perhaps the best known in the field with a number of
Metz’s individual articles (2014, 2017a, 2017b) extending its themes. While Unah’s
book chapter including Confucianism (1996) did not compare the Chinese tradition
with any African one, his somewhat related 2014 journal article did, doubling the ante
with the inclusion of Daoism and by raising a thought-provoking methodological
distinction between “comparison” and “dialogue”. It is possible to see Metz’s review
“from an African perspective” (2016) of Chenyang Li’s book on Confucian harmony
(2014), which was then followed-up by an extended reply from Li (2016), as an
exchange that enriched SARS. It was also implicitly, to my mind, a response to
Unah’s call (2014) for more actual dialogue to take place between tradition
representatives. Ampiah’s (2014) attempt to decenter the uniqueness of Confucian
values through his comparison of them to values held in Akan culture is a challenge
that should be answered.
Of the religious studies scholars, Kruger’s book (1995) relating the thoughtsystem of traditional San hunter-gathers with Buddhism (and Christianity) is eclectic
but ground-breaking. Michel Clasquin, Kruger’s former doctoral student, wrote an
intriguing dissertation with a chapter comparing Buddhism to “African thought” and
Ubuntu (1999). About 27 per cent of texts are Primary texts.
(3) Proximate range texts are less successful attempts or ones somewhat
excludable due to technicalities. For example, Chris O. Akpan’s (2011) comparison
of the thought of Siddhartha Gautama, the historical Buddha, with traditional African
views on causality is a fine starting point. However, Gautama’s “Indian” Buddhism
would have to be related to the (much) later ruminations on the topic by Chinese
innovators of Buddhist thought such as Du Shun (杜順) to count unreservedly as a
Sino-African reflective text. About 8 per cent of texts are Proximate texts.
(4) Provocative range texts employ ideas and/or approaches that are at present
quite atypical within Sino-African reflective studies but are nonetheless intriguing
and have the potential to open up the field in new exciting directions. They would
likely instigate significant readjustment of the ideas/frames/traditions utilized in
Primary range texts. For example, David Robinson-Morris’ book (2018) relating
Ubuntu and Buddhism to education topics is heavily infused with postmodern theory,
perspectives rarely employed in Sino-African reflective scholarship. About 13 per
cent of texts are Provocative texts.
(5) Peripheral range texts are often reflective studies that are noticeably
imbalanced. Such texts typically consider ideas from one tradition and barely any or
none from the other tradition allegedly engaged. An example of such is a volume
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edited by international relations scholar Stephen Chan (2013) on the ethics of China’s
involvement with Africa. Both the preface and first chapter by Chan are valuable
additions of Confucian ideas to SARS, as are a number of reflections by the book’s
other contributors. However, little time is spent discussing African philosophical
perspectives on morality. About 27 per cent of texts are Peripheral texts.
5.2 ORGANIZATIONAL MERITS OF RANGES
Using range as an organizing principle advances SARS toward SAP’s Identity in at
least two ways. First, it gives the myriad SARTs a shared trajectory toward SAP. It
preserves the intellectual diversity of SARS while channeling its ideas in common
direction. Ranges achieve this by providing SARTs with categorical alternatives to
discipline-based identities that could be meaningful to the philosophical renovation
project. The range-organizing principle frees up ideas for assessment vis-à-vis the
creation of SAP. The realization of SAP is, however, some ways off.
This brings us to the second way, closer to the existing material, that organization
by range establishes a shared progression: by channeling the insights of nonphilosophy SARTs toward “philosophical SARTs.” Philosophical SARTs tend to be
among the more rigorous in their reflection on concepts cross-culturally. These texts
are not necessarily authored by philosophers. However, it does appear that
philosophers authored the majority of Primary texts (about 9 out of 16 or 56 per cent)
and the lowest number of Peripheral texts (about 1 out of 16 or 6.25 per cent). With
philosophical SARTs authored by philosophers and non-philosophers represented
strongly within the Primary range, this type of text becomes not just the kind that
would be most familiar to comparative philosophers but also becomes the preferred
vehicle to conduct SARTs toward SAP. Having overcome the limits of “discipline”
within SARS, the next step is to overcome “tradition” itself.
5.3

RENOVATION OF SARS BY “GENRE” PRINCIPLE

Interest in the unusual topic of African and Chinese philosophical comparison is not
piqued, I think, by the prospect of examining “texts” or “disciplines.” It is stimulated by
curiosity—and incredulity, frankly—toward the proposition that Chinese and African
traditions could have conceptualized similarly any of their respective long-held, widespread cultural, religious and/or philosophical ideas. That in certain important
philosophical ways, Chinese and African traditions are more alike on certain
philosophical principles than either is, generally, to Western philosophy.10
10

For example, according to Metz:
There is a kernel of truth in the claim that Western thought about international justice, development theory
and related topics . . . is characteristically individualist. By this it is meant that Euro-American-Australasian
global ethical reflection typically locates basic moral value in properties intrinsic to a person or an animal. In
contrast, ethical thought that is salient amongst sub-Saharan peoples and those in countries such as China,
Taiwan, Japan and Korea is relational (Metz 2014, 146).
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It is reasonable, then, to expect that “tradition” would be an important notion in
SARS. “Tradition” is like “discipline” in that both are matrixes for Chinese and
African concepts. Both are potentially large elements of SARS to be reworked for
SAP. However, traditions are far more salient categories than “disciplines”. Within
SARS they are a ubiquitous, a salient feature of nearly every study, whereas one is
usually required to suss out the disciplinary orientation of a text. There is little doubt
that in meta-philosophical terms, “tradition” could serve as a chief organizing
principle for SARS. If so, the question of which African and/or Chinese tradition(s)
should be employed toward this end becomes pressing. There are several macro- and
sub-traditions listed in SARS, as we saw, that could be potential competitors.
More from the African “side” could be mentioned. Discussed in some of the
published works from which SARTs are drawn, there are “traditional” cosmological,
ontological and ethical ideas created by the now unknown sages of various subSaharan ethnic groups. Such groups are the Dinka and Shilluck of South Sudan, the
Etsako and Owan of Nigeria, the Dogon of Mali, the Bambara of Republic of Guinea,
the Fon of Benin, and the Diola of Senegal (see Kamalu 1990; Igbafen 2014). Added
to the dozen or more other African or Asian cultural, religious or philosophical
traditions mentioned in SARS, it is clear that attempting to constellate roughly sixty
SARTs around twenty-odd traditions would be unproductive. How then should
‘tradition’ as an organizing principle be operationalized?
I propose organizing by tradition through genres. I define ‘genre’ as a cluster of
several similarly paired Sino-African comparisons that is named after a specific
African or Chinese culture, religion or tradition. Genres should include Chinese (and
occasionally non-Chinese but Asian) traditions and African traditions that are directly
compared. This standard immediately sets aside Dinka, Shilluck, Etsako, Owan,
Dogon, Bamara, Fon and Diola discussions for none are directly compared to Chinese
traditions in the texts surveyed (though I advocate such engagements with these and
other “discrete” African traditions). The next question is this: Of the remaining
traditions, should African or Chinese tradition-names take precedence?
5.4 AFRICAN OR CHINESE GENRES?
I recommend at this time the use of names from Chinese traditions to label and
differentiate genres. If SARTs are grouped under specific Chinese/Asian traditions, at
least three major traditions are identifiable as having engagements with African
traditions (with one divisible into five “sub-traditions”). They are Confucianism (with
roughly twenty cross-cultural contacts); Daoism (with about five); and Buddhism
(with around fifteen: one Theravada, one Indian Madhyamaka, one Indian Yogacara,
three Tibetan, and about eleven Chinese). The remaining fifteen or so SARTs would
fit under generalized-tradition categories such as “Chinese philosophy”, “East Asian
values”, et cetera. If SARTs are grouped under specific African traditions, at least
five major traditions are identifiable. They are Ubuntu (with roughly fifteen
engagements); Akan (two); Yoruba (two); Igbo (one); and San (one). Many of the
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remaining thirty or so SARTs would fit under generalized-tradition categories such as
“African/sub-Saharan thought”, “African philosophy”, et cetera.
The ramifications of these figures for genre-labeling are these: If African
tradition-specific names were used to organize SARTs into genres that contain the
same type of cross-cultural pairings, Ubuntu would be the only specific African
tradition that could demonstrate substantial contact with all three major
Chinese/Asian traditions. While an “Ubuntu SARS”-genre would encompass contacts
with all three major Chinese traditions, this genre could only organize SARTs “by
Ubuntu” leaving all other tradition-specific African contacts with Chinese
philosophies by the wayside. What field, but especially a new one, could afford to
leave nearly 32 per cent (about seven out of approximately twenty-two traditionspecifics) of its more refined materials unused? Moreover, why reduce the already
small spectrum of African cultural diversity in SARS by elevating Ubuntu to genrestatus? Much inclusivity and many ideas would be lost if Ubuntu is used as the sole
tradition organizing principle.
The only other African tradition-category having substantial contact with
Confucianism, Buddhism and Daoism would be a general one, “sub-Saharan/African
thought” (with about eleven instances). Technically, this option would be excluded
prima facie because “sub-Saharan/African thought” is not culture/religion/philosophy
-specific. For the sake of thoroughness, however, I will consider this option.
If we attempt to organize SARTs by labeling a genre with such a big-name
generalization, that African genre would have negligible organizing power. This is
because virtually every instance of cross-cultural conceptual contact in SARS could
be included under that African rubric. An organizing principle should be able to
differentiate as it consolidates. Such mega-categories could nevertheless serve
adequately as preliminary frames for orienting the reader within relatively unfamiliar
comparative engagements (e.g., “This paper will compare ‘African thought’ to
‘Chinese thought’.”) Still, it is more difficult to see how genres named after large
cultural abstractions would help renovate the field.
However, if the three major Chinese specific-traditions are used to name genres,
virtually all instances of Sino-African contact would be included. Moreover, those
contacts could be arranged so that paired African and Chinese traditions sharing the
same Chinese tradition could naturally be grouped together. In short, employing
genres named after major Chinese traditions as organizing principles is attractive for
it grants SARS both scope and specificity. On the other hand, using Ubuntu, the only
tradition-specific African tradition capable of competing as a genre as an organizing
principle, would grant us specificity but insufficient scope.
5.5 ORGANIZATIONAL MERITS OF GENRES
Having argued that using Chinese tradition-names within SARS as genre-labels is at
this time more advantageous than to do so with African tradition-names, what would
be the anticipated effect on the development of SAP-Identity? Two come to mind.
First, the creation of genres would organize SARS works into easily recognizable
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sub-sets such as “Buddhist SARS”, “Confucian SARS” and “Daoist SARS”. This
development can help SARS become more accessible to both philosophers and nonphilosophers by presenting them with firm and familiar handholds on this new field.
Second, genres would facilitate the comparison of compared traditions. The
problem of scholars writing on one Sino-African tradition-pair seldom drawing on
scholarship written about a different tradition-pair could be diminished by using
genres. Hypothetically, grouping SARTs by Chinese-labeled genres would prompt
researchers to ask why it seems that most comparisons of, say, Confucianism and
Ubuntu are carried out by philosophers, while most comparisons of Buddhism and
Ubuntu seem to be conducted by religious studies scholars even though all three
traditions have been perceived as both religions and philosophies in SARS. Is this just
a fluke or is there something deeper going on intellectually, institutionally, even
(inter)nationally? Organizing SARS into tradition-based genres would enable one to
generate questions that before would probably not have been posed. This could in
turn better chances for inter-tradition and intra-tradition comparison/dialogue. That
organizing by range and genre principles would increase interaction among SARS’
disciplines and traditions is a fair expectation. Range and genre could together lead to
advancements being made faster and at greater analytical depth throughout the field.
In the next section, I extend the “renovation” of SARS toward the “construction”
of SAP. By mobilizing the movements, orientations and phases of CES as organizing
principles, I attempt to further assimilate SARS’ multiple disciplinary elements
philosophically and to traject what is useful toward the realization of SAP-Identity. In
CES terminology, I will engage in a constructive “treatment of a series of issues,
themes and topics of philosophical significance, which can be jointly concerned
through appropriate philosophical interpretation and/or from a broader philosophical
vantage point” (Mou 2010, 3).
6. CONSTRUCTION:
BLUEPRINTING SINO-AFRICAN PHILOSOPHY
6.1 CONSTRUCTION OF SARS BY “MOVEMENT” PRINCIPLE
SARS is a loose, multiple discipline formation. The development of a clearer
academic identity for it requires, in part, a stronger association between SARS and at
least one of its constitutive disciplines. Since the present renovation-construction
project prioritizes the redesign of SARS into a form of philosophy, a particular
“theme” in need of constructive “treatment” is that of possible associations between
SARS and intellectual movements within the discipline of philosophy. Examining
African philosophy and Chinese philosophy movements for such associations is
commonsensical given the prominence of each tradition in SARS. However, some
plausible associations, whether factual or theoretical, also should be made between
SARS’ non-philosophy disciplines and those African and Chinese philosophy
movements. This is because the cross-cultural philosophy under construction, SAP, is
envisioned to be an inter-disciplinary one.
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6.2

ASSOCIATING SARS WITH A “MODERN” CHINESE PHILOSOPHY
MOVEMENT

As a movement, the cultural tradition-identity of Mou’s constructive-engagement
strategy is relevant to SARS becoming SAP. CES’ primary “concern” has been to
expand and refine exchanges between Chinese and Western philosophy. However,
constructive-engagement has also welcomed correspondence between Chinese and
non-western traditions as part of its overall “movement toward world philosophy…”
(Mou 2009c, 37). African philosophy has been hailed specifically to become one of
its discussants.
At least two concrete examples of this association with the movement occurred at
the early part of this decade. In 2013, there was a colloquium on Confucianism and
African philosophy funded by a Confucius Institute, organized by Chinese and
African philosophy scholars, and held at Shanghai Jiao Tong University (Angle
2013). This event appears to have been an expanded follow-up to a 2010 colloquium
on Confucianism and Ubuntu also supported by the same Confucius Institute, but
held at Rhodes University in South Africa (Prinsloo and Charvat 2010; Angle 2013).
I can also attest to associations between the movement and SARS from direct
experience. Bai Tongdong, a respected Chinese political philosophy scholar, was a
participant in the 2013 colloquium. Two years later, he became my advisor when I
was accepted into his MA program in Chinese philosophy at Shanghai’s Fudan
University with a professed interest in Sino-African interchange. Since that time, I
have presented papers on Sino-African philosophy at conferences organized by major
Chinese/comparative philosophy associations. Judging from the feedback I received,
my work was not “merely tolerated”. It was welcomed but critiqued. I recount these
admittedly anecdotal experiences because I believe they do indicate a genuine
willingness by some Chinese philosophers to engage African philosophy.
6.3

ASSOCIATING SARS WITH A “NEW’ AFRICAN PHILOSOPHY
MOVEMENT

Associations could also be made between SARS and intellectual movements within
African philosophy. Perhaps more than with any other trend in that system, parallels
could be drawn between SARS and the conversational philosophy of Nigerian
philosopher Johnathan O. Chimakonam. While African philosophy for most of the
twentieth century has been in many ways an internationally directed enterprise, it
simultaneously has struggled to escape the legacy of “conceptual colonization” by the
West, to use Kwasi Wiredu’s well known coinage. 11 The struggle to break this
11

‘Conceptual colonization’ refers to the “historical superimposition of foreign categories of thought
on African thought systems through colonialism” (Wiredu 1996, 136). To struggle against this
phenomenon, Wirdeu advocates a critical interrogation of such categories but also the appropriation of
potentially useful ideas (i.e., “conceptual decolonization”).

Comparative Philosophy 10.1 (2019)

DOTTIN

55

unwarranted intellectual grip on African religion and philosophy has concurrently
been a quest to establish a vital modern identity for African philosophy, as Kenyan
philosopher D.A. Masolo has shown (1994). However, this struggle and quest have
had the unfortunate consequence of miring a good deal of African philosophical
debate in what African-American/Native American philosopher Jennifer Lisa Vest
condemned as “perverse dialogues” (2009) which regularly stymied efforts to forge
enriching correspondences.
Conversational philosophy is a definitive break with this pattern. Chimakonam’s
vision for it invites
…active engagement between individual African philosophers in the creation of critical
narratives either by engaging the elements of tradition or straight-forwardly by producing
new thoughts or by engaging other individual thinkers. It thrives on incessant questioning
geared toward the production of new concepts, opening up new vistas and sustaining the
conversation” (Chimakonam 2017).

It is this “opening of new vistas”, of entering rigorous but mutually respectful
dialogues, predominantly but not exclusively, with Western philosophy that defines in
part this “New Era” (Chimakonam 2017) in African philosophy. Relevant to the SAPIdentity construction project are that these developments parallel some of what has
been occurring within Sino-African reflective studies. SARS dovetails somewhat with
Chimakonam’s explicit formulation of a comparative philosophy approach, his
“Global Expansion of Thought” (2015). ‘GET’, as he abbreviates it, is a systematic
attempt to position African philosophy “among the world’s philosophical traditions
and to find new conversations…comparative and intercultural engagements…on
issues of mutual concern” (2015, 462).
Yet despite their similar philosophical inclinations, the conversational movement
and the constructive-engagement movement seem virtually unaware of each other.
They do share features in common, however. First, they are contemporaneous
movements with both having originated around the turn of the twenty-first century.
Second, both perhaps have found some inspiration in the remarkable economic
growth China and several African countries have experienced over the last quarter
century. From these trends, a rise in confidence that their traditions would have to be
heard and perhaps heeded more may have arisen. Third, both movements seek critical
yet civil, creative but accountable dialogue with traditions beyond their own regions.
6.4

ASSOCIATING INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (IR) AND IR-SARS TO
MOVEMENTS

Having discussed some of the actual and potential associations there could be
between philosophy-SARS and African and Chinese philosophy movements, what is
left is to theorize associations between non-philosophy SARS and African and
Chinese movements. I will attempt to do so with a particular non-philosophy field:
International Relations (IR).
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With at least seven non-philosophy disciplines constituting the proto-field,
advancing SARS through philosophy foremost is bound to attract some interest in the
theories, approaches and perhaps the movements that have equipped scholars of
Chinese and African philosophy to take the initiative. International Relations, which
is deeply involved in Sino-African studies and makes up about a quarter of SARTs,
seems increasing ready for such association.
Chris Alden, a key figure in the development of Sino-African studies from an IR
perspective, has criticized “the absence of [a theoretical] center of gravity” (2013, 1)
within the subject. Alongside IR, five other disciplines structure Sino-African
relations studies thereby resulting in it being “informed by…[the] ontologies and
epistemological concerns…of each of these approaches” (2013, 1). Stephen Chan
illustrates the problem thusly:
…Western views of China in Africa are often constructed by Sinologists who are not
Africanists, or Africanists who are not Sinologists, or by Africanists and Sinologists who
are not expert in international relations…or international relations scholars who know
nothing about either China or Africa (Chan 2013b, 7).

Consequently, there are “fundamental divergences as to the purposes of academic
work” (Alden 2013, 2-3). Alden points to the need for an “investigative backbone…
[to] develop meaningful conversations across disciplines about…China-Africa”
(2013, 3).
There could be greater associations made between IR-SARS and CES and GET,
the latter two conceivably being represented by some philosophy SARTs, in spirit, if
not to the letter. The basis of this assertion is that both IR and these movements share
a “burgeoning interest in the China-Africa relationship…precisely due to its function
as the key metaphor for…transformative globalization experience in the twenty-first
century” (Alden 2013, 2).
Ghanaian IR scholar Seth N. Asumah situates this “metaphor” within what Mou
might call a particular kind of “development of society”, namely, “African
development”. Asumah contends that “[in] this era of globalization and SinoAfricanization, there is an urgency to reexamine the decolonization discourse and its
concomitant questions, issues, and prospects for the African continent in relation to
the process of development and modernization” (Asumah 2011, xi, my emphasis).
Asumah then goes on to locate the metaphor more precisely within a set of reflective
and material coordinates related to the “development of philosophy”: “With the
emergence of ethnophilosophy, the intensity and scope of decolonization discourse,
the effects of globalization, and Chinanization, the task of interrogating the African
self and the European other has become more complex…” (Asumah 2011, xii, my
emphasis).
That Asumah, the political scientist, pens this analysis and agenda in the foreword
of a philosopher’s book, that of Nigerian Sanya Osha, is significant given the
seeming disconnect between philosophy-SARS and Sino-African International
Relations studies. Yet he sees a crucial role for philosophy to perform: as a generator

Comparative Philosophy 10.1 (2019)

DOTTIN

57

of reflections that “sharpen…discursive approaches to provide agency for rapid
changes in what is the cerebral and practical due to international interactions”
(Asumah 2011, xvii). And so too did Kumpe and Chen (2014) see a role for a more
philosophical outlook. These scholars questioned the “wisdom” of building a “longterm strategic partnership” for African development upon “asymmetrical” relations
with China—but then proceed to elide both Chinese and African philosophies on the
matter. And like Asumah so did, Chan and Patrick Mazimhaka, the latter a former
Deputy in the African Union organization who is a contributor to Chan’s book. They
both call for greater “African agency” in international dealings—but only Chan
entertains the matter philosophically and then only through a Confucian frame.
However, if Sino-African IR scholars became more familiar with the
“contemporary trend toward world philosophy” (Mou 2009b) in the Chinese tradition
and the “striving toward the universal space where intercultural engagement…is
unveiled” (Chimakonam 2015, 463) in the African tradition, perhaps other IR
scholars would see in those movements something of what drives their own field.
They would observe, as American philosopher David Wong did of comparative
philosophy more generally, that “trends of philosophy are often reflections or
distillations of…shifting balances of power between different regions of the world”
(2014). That between the Charybdis of structuralist development theory and the
Scylla of multiple discipline “rainbow eclecticism” Alden marginally prefers (2013,
3), a philosophy-led SARS developed further as SAP may represent a forwardthinking alternative.
That third option not only could benefit Sino-African IR theoretically but could
also give SAP an academic partner with better access to and, I dare say, more
credibility with policymakers and non-governmental actors. In other words, in CES
terms, a stronger association between IR and the aforementioned Chinese and African
movements could help SARS/SAP realize perhaps its most difficult goal to achieve:
“the development of contemporary society.”
The points above can be summarized as follows: (1) particular African and
Chinese philosophical movements are intellectual kin to philosophy-SARTs in the
sense that those SARTs reflective characteristics and cosmopolitan inclinations align
with those movements; (2) non-philosophical SARS (such as those often produced by
IR scholars) can be related to African and Chinese movements (and hence
philosophical SARS indirectly) via a prescriptive meta-philosophical vantage point,
SAP-Identity, which is broader than the category of discipline or tradition.
Admittedly, more work needs to be done to further associate SARS to African and
Chinese philosophy movements. But the argument made here should be sufficient to
make the proposition that associations do exist, or, that they are plausible to achieve.
SARS, hitherto unclaimed by either tradition, can attest to having some kinds of
intellectual kinship to both through a movement organizing principle. In the next
section, I move on to the constructive organizing principle, “orientation”.
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7. CONSTRUCTION OF SARS BY “ORIENTATION” PRINCIPLE
Considered from the “broader vantage point” of SAP-Identity, what is SARS’
“philosophical orientation”? There are three possibilities available in CES. One is a
historical and descriptive orientation which seeks to “accurately describe relevant
historical facts and pursue what thinkers actually thought, what resources they used,
and what appears to be similar and different” (Mou 2009b, 586, author’s emphasis).
Another is the reflective-interpretation orientation which enriches “our understanding
of a thinker’s ideas and their due implications of philosophical significance via…
conceptual and explanatory resources, whether those resources were actually used by
the thinker herself” (Mou 2009b, 587). Finally, there is the philosophical-issueengagement orientation geared “to see how…both sides under comparative
examination could…contribute to…philosophical issues or topics, rather
than…providing a historical or descriptive account of each or…interpreting some
ideas historically developed in a certain tradition…” (Mou 2009b, 589).
Having surveyed SARS literature, I share the following observations: (1) While
some texts include a smattering of history, very few SART authors displayed
sustained interest in the histories of concepts, thinkers or traditions under their review
(Wratten 1995 is perhaps the most notable exception). Therefore, SARS is not at
present historical-description oriented; (2) While authors usually described the
concepts they compared, a pronounced application theory or interpretive techniques
was not typically used to enrich the reader’s comprehension of a discussed thinker’s
ideas. Therefore, SARS is not presently reflective-interpretation oriented; (3) The
majority of cross-cultural engagements fit the following profile: “Typically,
addressing a jointly concerned issue of philosophy, substantial ideas historically
developed in distinct philosophical traditions are directly compared in order to
understand how they could jointly and complementarily contribute to this issue in
philosophically interesting ways” (Mou 2010, 17). Therefore, most SARTs currently
are philosophical-issue concerned. That SARS is predominantly philosophical-issue
oriented is “fortunate”. This is because the next potential organizing principle from
CES, phase, is especially intended to analyze “the characteristic features of a
reflective project with this as its primary orientation…” (Mou 2009a, 8, my
emphasis). Phases have dual meta-implications for SARS/SAP-Identity, as I will
demonstrate.
8. CONSTRUCTION OF SARS BY “PHASE” PRINCIPLE
8.1

PHASES

“Phases of engagement” are Mou’s delineation of three stages of philosophical-issue
constructive-engagement that could occur in inter-tradition comparison. The three
stages are
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The pre-engagement phase, in which certain ideas from distinct accounts or from
different traditions that are relevant to the common concern under examination and thus
to the purpose of the project are focused on and identified; [t]he engagement phase, in
which those ideas internally engage with each other in view of that common concern and
the purpose to be served; and [t]he post-engagement phase, in which those distinct ideas
from different sources are now absorbed or assimilated into a new approach to the
common concern under examination (Mou 2010, 17, author’s emphases).

Mou indexes to each phase one of three criticisms typically leveled against
philosophical-issue oriented comparative philosophy:
The three alleged “sins” [are]…. The “sin” of over-simplification regarding a certain idea
identified from a certain…tradition…[is] associated with reflective efforts in the preengagement phase; the “sin” of over-use of external resources regarding elaborating a
certain idea from a certain…tradition…[is] associated with…the engagement phase; and
the “sin” of blurring assimilation…[is] associated with…the post-engagement phase
(Mou 2010, 17).

Mou refutes each of these allegations in turn. Debunking the so-called “sin of oversimplification,” he counters
In the pre-engagement phase, it might be not only legitimate but also adequate or even
necessary to provide simplification and abstraction of some ideas in one…tradition
through a perspective…most relevant…to the joint concern addressed…without
involving those irrelevant elements in the…tradition from which such a perspective
comes, though the latter might be relevant to figuring out the point of those ideas (Mou
2010, 18).

To do away with the so-called “sin of over-use”, Mou writes:
In the engagement phase…From each party’s point of view, the other party is something
external without; but, from a broader philosophical vantage point and in view of the
jointly concerned issue, the distinct views may be complementary within. In this context,
the term ‘external’ would miss the point in regard to the purpose here…in view of the
issue, all those perspectives become internal in the sense that they would be
complementary and indispensable to a comprehensive understanding and treatment of the
current philosophical issue (Mou 2010, 18).

Finally, making short-work of the so-called “sin of blurring assimilation,” Mou
writes:
In the post-engagement phase, some sort of assimilation typically . . . would adjust, blur
and absorb different perspectives into one new approach as a whole. This would be what
is really expected in this kind of reflective engagement in studies of comparative
philosophy, instead of a sin (Mou 2010, 18).
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8.2 PROTO-ENGAGEMENTS AND NON-ENGAGEMENTS
I agree with Mou’s description and defense of phases, but as one could imagine,
actual cases of philosophical-issue inter-tradition comparison could necessitate
alterations in this framework. In particular, the ren-construction of SARS into SAP
requires changes in some ways we think about phases.
One difficulty in utilizing phases for SAP’s development is a categorical one.
Many SARTs would not be admissible under any of Mou’s three phases. Yet it would
be imprudent to discard SARS texts that may not fit appropriately within existing
phases. Those conceptual or methodological materials might serve as desiderata for
SAP’s build-up. Therefore, from an ongoing analysis of the literature, I conceived of
two supplements to Mou’s original set: Proto-engagements and Non-engagements.
Texts belonging to the proto-engagement phase contain ideas that are
intellectually promising, regardless of their disciplinary origins, for the construction
of SAP but require further philosophical digestion before use. (One could draw
parallels between some of the efforts likely required for that processing and “the
conceptual and explanatory” efforts associated with the reflective-interpretation
orientation.) Sino-African texts that cannot meet even this charitable standard after
being metabolized philosophically by movement, orientation and Mou’s original
phases are designated as non-engagements.
Using the definitions and sins of each phase as basic assessment parameters for
assigning surveyed texts to different phases of engagement, I have come to the
following tentative conclusions: (1) no SARS text appears to qualify as a PostEngagement; (2) no SARS text appears to qualify as a “Primary” Engagement; (3)
about 50 per cent of SARS texts qualify as Pre-Engagements; (4) about 20 per cent of
SARS texts qualify as Proto-Engagements; (5) about 30 per cent of SARS texts
qualify as Non-Engagements.
8.3 ORGANIZATIONAL MERITS OF PHASES
What are the benefits of using phase “discriminations” to categorize SARS texts?
Phases help advance Identity through the introduction of Inquiry. A text can be
assigned a rank indicating its level of meta-methodological development alongside its
tradition-named genre, such as “Confucian Pre-engagement SARS”, “Daoist Primary
engagement SARS” or “Buddhist Post-engagement SARS”. Phase-categorization
provides a more exact sense of the “location” of a study within the emerging protofield (as SARS is forming and as it is being reformed into something closer to SAP,
as I will discuss). Phases also indicate where studies at a particular level of
development are “clustering.” Hence, organizing by phase informs one quickly and
precisely where, categorically speaking, more work should be directed and what kind
of work should be conducted.
For example, since no SART examined seems to have reached the PostEngagement level, is it fair to conclude that no SART engenders a substantially new
approach to their topic matter? Based on the definition of this phase, then “yes.” But
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what of Provocative range texts? Why have they been “phased out”? I doubt SAP can
arise from SARS until the latter moves beyond its present mainly positive
comparativist demonstrations of conceptual parallels and divergences. There would
have to be a fair increase in the creation of new inter-tradition “Sino-African” ideas
and approaches for SARS to advance convincingly toward SAP. I believe that even a
modest record of doing so is key to the ren-construction of a strong identity for SARS
in comparative philosophy.
Regardless of the reason for the phase-out, there is a larger meta-point to
consider. The “friction” here between range and phase is an example of a creative
tension between meta-perspectives (in this case, renovation and construction) that
could spur some who reflect on Sino-African materials to “look deeper” than they
would if they employed conventional non-meta-level comparisons. For example,
while the absence of Post-texts might be chalked up to the newness of the field, it is
more difficult to explain the absence of texts in the less demanding “primary”
Engagement category. I would speculate that a meta-philosophical or metamethodological threshold has not yet been reached—that of “internalization”, to use
Mou’s term above. It is possible to fathom such is the problem, for this explanation
resonates with the characterization I offered above for why deeper investigations of
jointly concerned concepts have lagged—again, Allinson’s positive comparativism.
Allinson analogizes positive comparativism to a “stream” or mode of engaging in
cross-cultural comparative philosophy (2001, 280). It is too soon to tell definitively if
the connection I have hypothesized between Allinson’s stream and Mou’s phase is the
actual or full reason for the lack of progression beyond pre-engagement, even for
philosophy-SARS. But it should prompt one to ask what might a text wherein
concepts are “internally engaged” toward their “jointly-concerned issue” through
“appropriate philosophical interpretation” look like. SARS scholars may wish to
spend more conscious effort introducing “broader philosophical vantage points” for
such concerns if they wish advance their works in an arguably necessary direction
towards Primary engagements, and ultimately, Post-engagements.
That most SARS texts are Pre-Engagements is noteworthy, as well. First, this
phase’s possession of roughly half the number of SARTs reinforces the thesis that
these texts can be reasonably understood as philosophical efforts irrespective of
origin. Second, each Chinese tradition-labeled genre is decently represented in this
category. As Pre-Engagements, texts within a certain range and traditions in all
genres occupy, for the first time, the same meta-philosophical category (i.e., phase).
Yet this phase is also meta-methodologically useful for the analysis of texts. Located
at the intersection of both Identity and Inquiry object-ives, I would suppose that at
least some Pre-engagement SARS reflections may together constitute a unique
liminal area within ren-construction wherein the work on Identity begins to shift
towards the work on Inquiry. With phases, reflections on Sino-African joint concerns
are still organized toward SAP but have been largely dis-organized from the strictures
of discipline and tradition which have diminished SARS in both incisiveness and
inventiveness.
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9. SINO-AFRICAN PHILOSOPHIZED REFLECTION
Having shown that non-philosophy-derived SARS can “through the appropriate
philosophical interpretation and/or from a broader philosophical vantage point” be
treated virtually as philosophical engagements (of varying quality), I propose granting
SARS an intermediate status between its current multiple discipline state and SAP.
This provisional identity I will call Sino-African philosophized reflection (SAPR).
The achievement of SAPR status signals that the progressive repositioning and
reframing of Sino-African philosophy-SARS and non-philosophy SARS reflections
through the organizing principles of range, genre, movement, orientation and phase
have been undertaken and have been reasonably successful. These reflections, which
would still vary by topical focus, analytical technique, originality, depth and even
“politics” (for what may count as a "development of society" is not a value-neutral
decision or standard), can nonetheless be said to be sufficiently primed for further
advancement toward SAP through appropriate Inquiry organizing principles (which
will not be discussed at this time). SAPR represents a transitional state that could
enable researchers to constructively engage concepts and approaches found in SARS
without undue pre-judgement. SAPR would therefore facilitate the extraction of ideas
despite their disciplinary identities or tradition-pairings. As these reflections undergo
additional investigation and/or enhancement during the construction of SAP-Inquiry
via CES, this template/scaffolding could be used to elevate those reflections beyond
their current provisional acceptance as SAPRs. With additional appropriate
construction, those SAPRs would in sum become Sino-African philosophy itself.
10. CONCLUSION
With the appropriate interventions, disorganization need not continue to undercut
SARS’ potential to achieve more incisive reflections on China’s and Africa’s bedrock
traditions and emerging forms of thought. This is why the Renovation-Construction
of SARS for SAP is explicitly a prescriptive endeavor. This is why Ren-Construction
could not be limited to merely addressing what this author believes is the
philosophically less interesting question of what SARS “is”. While that descriptive
task was necessary to familiarize the reader about this inchoate field of inter-tradition
study, this paper is guided by the more energizing meta-philosophical questions of
what SARS should become, of what methods ought to be employed towards that
development, and the question of why the intended end-product—SAP—should be
sought.12 I have considered these questions from the vantage point of SAP’s Identity.
What remains to be designed at another time is Sino-African philosophy’s dimension
of Inquiry.

12

My phrasing here is influenced by Overgaard et al. 2013, 12-13.
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